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a b s t r a c t 
The long-term legacies of civil war economies —often characterized by widespread illicit economic activities and 
the proliferation of criminal and quasi-criminal networks —pose significant challenges to achieving sustainable 
postwar settlements. This essay surveys predominant strategies to address war economies in peace processes 
for countries emerging from war. I identify three prevailing approaches —criminalization, co-option, and ne- 
glect —and discuss trade-offs associated with each. While there is no clear consensus on which approach is most 
likely to succeed and most countries will require a balanced combination of all three, it is increasingly clear 
that peace agreements that fail to sufficiently incorporate the perspectives of communities dependent on illicit 
economies and to account for how illicit economies shape national and subnational political settlements are more 
likely to produce unstable postwar regimes in the medium to long-run. I conclude with some reflections on future 
research agendas and potential policy implications that merit further exploration. 
Introduction 
In countries emerging from war, how do illicit economies impact the 
likelihood and character of peace settlements? Are actors profiting from 
these economies likely to view the prospect of peace as threatening to 
their interests, and act as spoilers? Or can illicit financial flows be used 
to incentivise violent actors to lay down arms? Should illicit economies 
be addressed as part of the peace process, and if so, how and when? 
How might these choices affect the prospects of achieving successful 
outcomes? 
This essay surveys predominant strategies to address war economies 
in peace processes for countries emerging from contemporary civil wars. 
These conflicts are frequently marked by an exponential rise in illicit 
economic activities, often encouraged or co-opted by armed groups par- 
ticipating in the conflict. As a result, it is widely assumed within the in- 
ternational community, amongst decision-makers in regimes struggling 
with insurgencies, and in large segments of the media and public imagi- 
nation that illicit economies and violence go hand-in-hand. From ’blood 
diamonds’, to ’conflict timber’, to ’narco-guerillas’, such associations are 
commonplace; while the terminology may differ, the presumption that 
illicit economies drive conflicts is a familiar one. 
As civil wars draw to a close, these associations pose significant 
challenges for policymakers. Today’s civil wars often last for decades, 
by which time illicit economies may comprise a dominant share of 
the economy: in Afghanistan, for example, the value of the opium 
economy in 2017 was estimated to be between 6 to 11 percent of 
Afghanistan’s GDP —larger than all officially recorded licit exports com- 
bined ( UNODC, 2018 ). The sheer scale of illicit activities and the life- 
lines they provide to large segments of the population dependent on 
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illicit incomes to survive —not to mention the fact that many prominent 
actors may be active participants in illicit activities themselves —means 
that these economies are unlikely to simply wither away as conflicts 
end. And yet, governments who have consistently sought to paint their 
opponents as being motivated by profits from illicit economies and as- 
sociated with predatory criminal networks during wartime may find 
it difficult to avoid confronting these issues as part of the peace pro- 
cess —compounded by fact that they may be under pressure by external 
actors to stem the flow of illicit goods as a ‘natural’ step in the postwar 
statebuilding process. 
Policymakers in such contexts therefore face difficult dilemmas and 
trade-offs in addressing illicit economies in peace processes, both in the 
short and long-term. In the short-term, policymakers must forge peace 
settlements that balance multiple variables: the economic interests of 
various elites on all sides of the conflict, some of whom may have a 
personal stake in preserving existing shadow economies; the economic 
livelihoods of communities dependent on illicit incomes to survive; and 
international pressures to curb the trafficking of illicit goods, particu- 
larly drugs. Forging a stable settlement under these circumstances is no 
simple task. 
At the same time, policymakers must grapple with how to address 
the long-term legacies of war economies, and carefully consider what 
impacts these economies will have in shaping the postwar order. This 
is particularly challenging with illicit drugs, as there are typically few 
opportunities, if any, to transition drugs into licit commodities. Rein- 
ing in the influence of militias and criminal networks established dur- 
ing wartime —and the violence associated with these groups —has also 
frequently bedeviled many postwar governments. More broadly, policy- 
makers must ask themselves fundamental questions about the place of 
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illicit economies in society in the medium to long-term. Is it true that 
drugs and other illicit goods are antithetical to stabilization and devel- 
opment, or can these commodities make a positive contribution to de- 
velopment and political stability in some cases? What are the trade-offs 
of different approaches, and how should these be evaluated? 
This essay provides an overview of these dilemmas and some re- 
flections on how our collective understanding of these issues might be 
improved. I begin with a brief overview of literature highlighting the 
characteristics of war economies, the link between illicit economies and 
conflict duration, and the challenges war economies pose for achiev- 
ing long-lasting peace settlements. I survey a number of transformation 
strategies used in past peace processes, from the criminalization of insur- 
gent economic networks to the use of financial incentives to lure rebels 
to the peace process, and the trade-offs inherent to each approach. While 
there is no clear consensus on which strategies are most effective, emerg- 
ing insights suggest that neglecting the economic dimension of conflict 
in peace processes is risky and potentially destabilizing in the long-run. 
Instead, stakeholders participating in peace processes should recognize 
how illicit economies shape national and subnational political settle- 
ments, often making positive contributions to the economic resilience 
and stability of marginalized communities. Policymakers should take 
account of these realities both while drafting formal agreements and in 
the design of longer-term peacebuilding strategies. Finally, I conclude 
by reflecting on further avenues of research and policy implications that 
could yield useful insights on how illicit economies should be managed 
in peace processes. 
Legacies of War Economies: A Threat to Sustainable Postwar 
Settlements? 
From the mid-1990s, civil war literature has increasingly drawn 
greater attention to the economic dimensions of conflict ( Berdal & Keen, 
1997; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; 2004; Keen, 2005; Ross, 2004 ). Case 
studies conducted by scholars such as Reno (1999) and Olsson and 
Fors (2004) have documented numerous examples of looting, extortion, 
and other forms of predatory economic activity against civilians by all 
parties to the conflict, including government armies and rebels alike. 
This body of work has emphasized the economic motivations of armed 
combatants, with opportunities for self-enrichment being the primary 
motivator for participating in violent conflict. 
Early iterations of this literature have come under criticism for be- 
ing too simplistic or dismissive of other socio-political drivers of civil 
war, including collective grievances, inequalities, and ideological beliefs 
( Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2013; Cederman et al., 2013; Di John, 2011; 
Sanín & Wood, 2014 ). Additionally, the relationship between violence 
and lootable goods is not always straightforward: in a study of 42 coun- 
tries with lootable resources, Snyder (2006) found that in some cases, 
the presence of lootable resources contributed to greater political sta- 
bility, depending on how resources were governed and extracted. While 
scholars have generally moved beyond theoretical models of civil war 
that attribute conflict to economic motives alone, a key insight from this 
literature relevant to the discussion on peace settlements argues that, 
once unleashed, civil wars generate unique political and economic con- 
ditions that often prove tenacious and difficult to reverse ( Spear, 2006 ). 
These conditions tend to linger beyond the conclusion of formal peace 
agreements, posing significant challenges for those hoping to craft sus- 
tainable postwar settlements. 
Characteristics of war economies 
Ballentine and Nitzschke (2013) have identified five properties com- 
mon to war economies: the destruction or circumvention of the formal 
economy, with increasingly blurred distinctions between formal, infor- 
mal, and criminal activities; widespread predatory behavior by armed 
combatants, such as pillaging, extortion, and violence against civilians 
to acquire control over lucrative assets; highly decentralized and pri- 
vatized economies, both in terms of production and exchange; armed 
group exploitation of licit and illicit trading networks; and finally the 
prevalence of cross-border trading networks, often based on kinship or 
ethnic ties, dominated by individuals with vested interests in the con- 
tinuation of conflict and instability. Cockayne and Lupel (2011) further 
observe that the political and economic importance of borderlands tends 
to expand during wartime relative to urban centers, due to the presence 
of licit and illicit cross-territorial networks that combatants depend on 
for funding and external access. Where non-state armed groups draw 
funding from these networks, they may be disincentivised from partic- 
ipating in peace negotiations due to their access to a reliable resource 
base that sustains their capacity for armed violence ( Cornell, 2007 ). War 
economies also present opportunities for individual combatants to amass 
significant personal fortunes; such individuals may see little economic 
benefit in supporting a transition to peace ( Spear, 2006 ). 
Nonetheless, there are indications that not all aspects of war 
economies are equally threatening to peace processes. Goodhand 
(2004) has disaggregated conflict economies into three typologies: cop- 
ing economies, shadow economies, and combat economies. Coping 
economies describe how economically vulnerable individuals and com- 
munities participate in illicit economies out of economic necessity, par- 
ticularly as conflict destroys their assets and closes off viable alterna- 
tives. In this case, revenues from illicit economies have positive effects 
on their economic resilience and livelihoods. Rather than fueling con- 
flict, access to steady informal incomes might raise the opportunity-cost 
of participating in the conflict and make some individuals otherwise sus- 
ceptible to violence less likely to join, though studies have found that 
this relationship is likely to be mediated by a variety of other factors 
( Berman et al., 2011; Cramer, 2011 ). For these sectors of the economy, 
the cessation of hostilities following a peace settlement may mitigate the 
problem, as sustained peace is likely to generate more economic alter- 
natives in the medium-to long-term, allowing communities to gradually 
move beyond coping activities ( Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2013 ). 
Shadow and combat economies pose different challenges for peace 
processes and postwar statebuilding. Shadow economies refer to cases 
where the economic activities of the state are captured by criminal 
groups, and combat economies refer to economic transactions that di- 
rectly facilitate war, including those dominated by state security ser- 
vices, rebel groups, and other conflict entrepreneurs ( Ballentine & 
Nitzschke, 2013 ). Illicit networks established and dominated by armed 
combatants in wartime readily transform into criminal economies in 
peacetime, potentially diverting resources away from the state and em- 
powering actors with little stake in establishing stable political set- 
tlements or supporting effective rule of law ( Ballentine & Nitzschke, 
2013; Wennmann, 2005 ). Past experience suggests that these factors 
increase the risk of conflict recurrence: one comparative study of six- 
teen peace processes found that the continuation of these networks and 
the ongoing proliferation of armed actors were major reasons for failure 
( Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005 ). And yet, peace settlements that ignore the 
reality of political authority established through conflict and exclude 
powerful elites with de-facto political and economic power are also 
likely to fail ( Cockayne & Lupel, 2011; Wennmann, 2014 ). As Felbab- 
Brown (2017b) has observed, participation in illicit economies present 
ample opportunities for belligerent groups to shore up political capital 
within the public, in some cases bestowing them with a greater degree 
of legitimacy than government authorities. Wennmann (2005) expresses 
the dilemma facing stakeholders as follows: “How do you manage non- 
state actors that, as a result of their parallel markets, are more powerful 
than the state or the donor community? ”
Grappling with Illicit Economies in Peace Processes: Dominant 
Approaches 
Governments and donors engaged in peace processes have opted for 
a number of strategies for addressing the potentially destabilizing ef- 
fects of war economies. Below, I describe three common strategies: co- 
optation, criminalization, and neglect. I briefly explore the benefits and 
risks of each. 
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Before proceeding, it bears emphasizing that these strategies are 
not mutually exclusive; they may each be used at different stages of 
the process, and may be applied simultaneously to different segments 
of the illicit economy. Indeed, some combination of strategies is the 
norm. In real-world scenarios, the process of peacebuilding is signifi- 
cantly messier, unpredictable, and evolving than presented here; as are 
the economic, political and ideological constraints faced by all partici- 
pants, including international actors with a stake in the outcome. Differ- 
entiating these approaches nevertheless provides an analytically useful 
framework to explore dominant approaches to addressing challenges of 
peacebuilding in these contexts. 
Furthermore, while illicit economies encompass a variety of goods, a 
predominant share of attention is often directed to the illicit drug econ- 
omy, for a number of reasons. First, illicit drug markets constitute one 
of the largest and most lucrative share of worldwide illicit flows. Illicit 
drugs frequently play a significant role in civil war economies, both as 
an economic resource for armed actors and as a means for civilians af- 
fected by war to survive. In the popular imagination, illicit drugs are fre- 
quently associated with violence and presented as a major global public 
health risk to a greater extent than most other illicit goods. As a result, 
an outsized amount of and resources have been allocated to suppressing 
illicit drugs worldwide, and governments emerging from war often face 
significant international pressure to curb domestic drug production and 
trafficking. Illicit drugs are therefore among the thorniest of issues to 
tackle in a peace negotiation. 
Finally, there is another possible scenario that I do not dwell on in 
this essay: cases of civil conflict which result in the total capitulation of 
one side, and where victors are therefore able to assert control over il- 
licit networks and impose their preferred policies unopposed. My focus 
here is on peace process scenarios involving some form of negotiated 
settlement, whether formal, informal or both. This focus is justified, as 
negotiated outcomes have become increasingly predominant since the 
end of the Cold War, while outright victories are increasingly uncommon 
( Kreutz, 2010 ). Moreover, even civil wars with decisive outcomes al- 
most always involve some level of bargaining and accommodation with 
communities supportive of the defeated side. While outright victors may 
nominally be in a stronger bargaining position than those beleaguered 
by stalemates, it will still be necessary to address the legacies of war 
economies in the postwar period; it is therefore prudent for policymak- 
ers to engage with these approaches regardless of how conflicts are re- 
solved. 
Co-optation of Elites and Illicit Networks 
One approach utilized during peace processes is to engage dominant 
non-state powerbrokers by enticing them with formal positions in a post- 
war settlement and/or other economic opportunities. These powerbro- 
kers may include both pro- and anti-government combatants, as well 
as organized criminal groups. This approach typically occurs when con- 
flicts have reached long-term stalemates and outright victory is unlikely 
to be achieved by either side. Co-optation may be targeted towards in- 
dividual elites, or be institutional in nature: a common manifestation of 
the latter approach is formally integrating non-state militias into the 
state armed forces or providing them with quasi-regulated status as 
private security companies or community policing units, for example. 
This approach has been adopted during peace settlements in numerous 
conflicts, including Afghanistan, Sudan, and El Salvador, among oth- 
ers ( Giustozzi, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Johnston, 2007 ). Some 
studies also suggest that incomes from illicit economies may be put to 
positive use by helping to buy off belligerents, facilitating negotiations 
and helping to solidify peace agreements ( Jonsson et al., 2016 ). Felbab- 
Brown (2017a) has described this process in Myanmar in the 1990s, 
where the government successfully incentivised insurgent groups to en- 
gage in ceasefires by granting permission to participate in resource ex- 
ploitation and illicit trading of a variety of goods, including the coun- 
try’s sizable drug economy. As a result, poppy cultivation has ballooned 
in certain border areas that have become more stable in recent years 
( Meehan, 2017 ). 
The primary advantage of this approach is that it takes account of ex- 
isting power differentials between the government and non-state actors, 
and may prevent difficult confrontations with these parties that the state 
has no realistic capacity to control by force. It recognizes that military 
networks controlled by powerbrokers are a common mechanism used to 
extract rents from illicit economies, and reduces the incentives of elites 
in control of these networks to oppose the peace process. In some cases, 
non-state actors have more capacity to provide security, basic services, 
and employment in borderland communities than the state; thus for- 
mally conferring them with responsibilities for service provision may 
avoid the disruption of services to civilians in the immediate aftermath 
of a peace agreement ( Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2013 ). Snyder (2006) has 
observed that institutional arrangements that allow for joint extraction 
of commodities by multiple groups of elites tend to produce more stable 
outcomes in conflict settings, providing greater evidence for the viabil- 
ity of this approach. 
However, as Snyder also acknowledges, establishing stable joint ex- 
traction regimes are particularly challenging with illicit drugs as com- 
pared to other commodities, as pressures from the international com- 
munity to suppress the drug economy may prove too difficult to re- 
sist. Arrangements that appear stable in the short-term may also break 
down over time; in Myanmar, ceasefires underpinned by joint extraction 
regimes began to fall apart by the mid-2000, in part as a result of the gov- 
ernment’s attempts to renegotiate economic settlements in order to cap- 
ture a greater share of illicit rents for themselves ( Felbab-Brown, 2017a ). 
The moral hazards of this approach should also be considered. By 
co-opting elites engaged in illicit networks, governments could be seen 
as rewarding those engaged in illicit activities during wartime, while 
conferring comparatively fewer benefits to individuals and communi- 
ties who refrained from participating. Co-option also risks conferring 
legitimacy on unpalatable and abusive warlords and other non-state 
actors, which may in turn damage the legitimacy of the state as a 
whole ( Studdard, 2004 ). Furthermore, co-opting belligerents may fa- 
cilitate transitions to peace in the short-term, but may entrench corrupt 
patronage networks into the formal system, encouraging the prolifer- 
ation of what Le Billon (2003) refers to as “spoils politics ”. Absent a 
realistic strategy for improved governance, attempting to reign in illicit 
economies by co-opting elites who control them may come at the cost 
of elite accountability and have the perverse effect of corrupting the 
formal system in the long-run. 
Criminalization and the Establishment of Control Regimes 
Another approach to managing illicit economies involves establish- 
ing stronger control regimes over conflict-specific commodities and con- 
ditioning peace processes on the reduction or elimination of cultivation 
and trafficking of narcotics and other illicit goods. These control regimes 
often aim to reduce illicit smuggling of lootable commodities associated 
with conflict —the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme was one such 
initiative created to reduce illegal mining and sale of diamonds linked to 
civil wars in Africa ( Paes, 2005 ). The lifting of international commodity 
sanctions may also be contingent on the establishment of stronger legal 
frameworks to manage commodities and the achievement of peace pro- 
cess benchmarks by all parties ( Le Billon, 2012 ). Criminalization and 
forced eradication is also a common approach in countries where illicit 
drugs are perceived to be funding parties to the conflict, as evidenced 
by substantial investments by the international community in counter- 
narcotics policies in post-2001 Afghanistan ( SIGAR, 2016 ) and the cur- 
rent peace process in Columbia, where the government’s negotiating 
position remains fixated on the end goal of prohibition ( Eventon, 2016; 
Vargas, 2014 ). 
An argument in favor of this approach is that careful and judicious 
targeting of illicit economies may bring benefits to peace processes by 
depriving belligerents of resources and incentivising armed groups to 
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cease hostilities ( Le Billon, 2012 ). Where parties are highly motivated to 
reach a peace agreement, donor conditionality may also provide incen- 
tives to pass positive governance reforms that would be more difficult 
to achieve once a settlement has passed. Provided that these reforms are 
designed with extensive consultations and buy–in from a wide variety 
of sectors, including communities most dependent on illicit economies, 
peace processes may present unique opportunities for substantive insti- 
tutional transformations. Such reforms could also play an integral role 
in broader disarmament, demoblization and reintegration processes, en- 
suring that armed actors who face greater deprivation from enhanced 
control regimes, such as mid-level commanders, are provided with real- 
istic economic alternatives as part of the peace process ( Spear, 2006 ) 
In many cases, however, an excessive focus on interdiction has been 
found to be counterproductive to peacebuilding. As Kalyvas (2015) has 
argued, linking insurgency with crime is often a convenient narra- 
tive for governments, as it underplays political grievances and assigns 
blame for the conflict to those motivated by opportunism. However, 
casting insurgents as criminals may foreclose political solutions that 
are necessary for long-term stability ( Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2013 ). 
Studdard (2004) has likened this approach to liddism , or attempting to 
suppress symptoms issues without addressing the root causes of crime 
and violence. Goodhand (2008) warns that this approach is often reduc- 
tionist, dismissing the complexity of subnational political settlements 
and failing to recognize that illicit economies have beneficially con- 
tributed to the stability and economic viability of many of these set- 
tlements, particularly in marginalized borderland communities. Policies 
aimed at rapidly disrupting or dismantling illicit economies may there- 
fore increase economic hardships in these communities, undermining 
support for the government, the donor community, and the peace pro- 
cess as a whole. 
Neglect 
A third strategy is to limit the scope of the peace process to ad- 
dressing high level political and security issues, while paying compar- 
atively little attention to organized crime and illicit economies. Policy- 
makers may see several virtues in this approach. It may simplify and 
accelerate peace processes considerably, and avoids conditioning peace 
agreements on conditions or reforms that will, in practice, be difficult 
or impossible to enforce. It is pragmatic about the fact that the out- 
break of peace may in fact create new opportunities for illicit networks 
to flourish, but unlike more confrontational approaches towards illicit 
economies, it also recognizes that some informal activities can be ben- 
eficial to statebuilding and reconstruction ( Studdard, 2004 ). This ap- 
proach tends to place more weight on the developmental aspects of il- 
licit economies, particularly illicit drugs, and on safeguarding the liveli- 
hoods of communities engaged in the coping side of illicit economies. 
In Afghan villages, opium cultivation has been shown to have numer- 
ous pro-social benefits, including enhanced social protection, increased 
economic growth, and improved local conflict resolution ( Pain, 2012 ). 
Rather than being inherently destructive, these activities can serve a 
generative function, providing pathways out of poverty and contribut- 
ing to economic conditions that can in turn provide stronger and more 
lasting foundations for peace. Under these circumstances, a policy of 
benign neglect towards illicit economies during peace processes may 
paradoxically produce greater stability and a reduced dependence on 
illicit economies in the long-run. 
While this strategy may accelerate negotiations and remove obsta- 
cles to reaching a peace agreement, focusing on resolving national- 
level political issues and ignoring local-level political economic issues 
is also fraught with risk. Failing to address particularly exploitative 
or violent aspects of war economies can result in the continuance of 
micro-level violence and the strengthening of local militias once for- 
mal peace agreements are concluded. In Haiti, armed combatants left 
to their own devices swiftly refashioned themselves into violent crim- 
inal gangs; similar dynamics have been observed in the Balkans and 
West Africa in postwar settings ( Hansen, 2014; Wannenburg, 2005 ). 
Scholars such as Kalyvas (2015) , Debos (2011) , and Newman and 
Keller (2007) have each cautioned against drawing dichotomous distinc- 
tions between wartime and peacetime; indeed, the influence of armed 
actors and levels of physical violence and exploitation against local com- 
munities may continue at similar rates after the conclusion of a peace 
agreement. Turning a blind eye to the involvement of militia groups in 
illicit economies may also place strategies for disarmament and demo- 
bilization at risk, as it allows these groups to retain substantial access 
to illicit funds without any firm commitments towards reducing vio- 
lence or accepting even nominal levels of state control. These conditions 
may constitute a dangerous breeding ground for future conflicts, placing 
prospects for long-term stability at risk. 
Conclusion: Emerging Insights and Areas for Future Research 
This essay contains an overview of key debates on illicit economies 
and peace processes. I identified three predominant strategies — co- 
option, criminalization, and neglect — that policymakers commonly use 
during peace processes to address the legacies of war economies, along 
with the benefits and risks of each. At present, there is no clear consensus 
on which strategies are most likely to succeed, or indeed, how success 
should be understood and measured. A common theme across the litera- 
ture is that peace agreements frequently fail to address illicit economies 
adequately, if at all, and that more resources should be devoted to un- 
derstanding these dynamics by stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding. 
Nonetheless, a few general themes can be observed of relevance to aca- 
demics and policymakers. 
On the imposition of control regimes, most studies concur that nu- 
anced strategies have the best chance to improve prospects for peace. 
Scholars are generally skeptical about the usefulness of widespread 
criminalization of the informal economy, and argue in favor of a sector- 
by-sector approach. An increasingly significant body of evidence sug- 
gests that the illicit drug economy provides positive economic bene- 
fits to poor and otherwise marginalized communities, and that forced 
eradication policies may be deeply unpopular and potentially destabi- 
lizing. Indeed, this appears to be the case in Colombia, where early 
indications suggest that attempts to displace the coca economy with 
alternative livelihoods as part of the peace agreement have been in- 
effective and poorly received ( Eventon, 2016 ). Absent significant and 
widespread public buy-in and realistic economic alternatives for com- 
munities dependent on illicit economies, efforts to aggressively suppress 
illicit economies in the immediate aftermath of war are unlikely to be 
effective and may risk a re-escalation of violence. For their part, interna- 
tional actors must be more sensitive to these issues and avoid applying 
undue pressure that may destabilize fragile situations. The Colombian 
case also demonstrates the importance of securing broad multi-party 
consensus on strategies to address illicit economies in peace agreements, 
in order to ensure that these strategies are not subsequently undermined 
following a change in government. 
Instead, a balanced approach is often the best way forward. It is pru- 
dent to bear in mind the distinctions between coping, shadow and con- 
flict economies, and develop tailored strategies for each. When engaging 
with insurgents and organized criminal groups, Cockayne (2010) argues 
in favor of dealing pragmatically with the majority of participants in the 
illicit economy, while ostracizing the most egregious norm-violators. He 
acknowledges, however, that distinguishing between these groups can 
be exceedingly difficult, and ultimately must be determined on a case- 
by-case basis. In practice, the opposite often occurs: egregious norm- 
violators are rewarded with elite positions, while small-scale partici- 
pants in illicit economies are the most affected by draconian criminal- 
ization policies. This is what occurred in post-2001 Afghanistan, with 
disastrous results. This is why it is crucial to identify the right balance 
of strategies for any given time period, and to avoid overly punitive 
measures for those most dependent on illicit economies to survive. Nu- 
anced strategies are also called for when dealing with members of armed 
groups: Spear (2006) recommends differentiating between individual 
combatants, and notes that mid-level officers in insurgent groups are 
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often neglected in peace negotiations, though they often carry the most 
direct influence over rebel fighters. 
Moreover, strategies should be tailored to local conditions as much 
as possible. Formal agreements that take account of existing political 
settlements at local and regional levels —and how these are sustained 
by illicit economies —are more likely to lead to greater stability. In de- 
velopment circles, it is almost a truism to argue in favor of a more partic- 
ipatory approach to peacebuilding, and few would outwardly disagree 
with the premise that marginalized communities should be consulted 
in the design and implementation of peace processes. It is unfortunate 
that this rarely occurs in a more than perfunctory fashion. The failure 
of Colombia’s national illicit crop substitution programme to deliver on 
many of its promises to provide support to coca growing regions as part 
of the peace process is a cautionary tale of how neglecting the needs of 
local populations can damage public faith and the viability of postwar 
settlements in the long run ( Gutiérrez, 2020 ). In borderland commu- 
nities, strategies should also take into account the interdependence of 
transnational economies, and strategies should be regionally-focused to 
avoid simply transplanting illicit economies across borders ( Nitzschke 
& Studdard, 2005; Studdard, 2004 ). 
Policymakers in countries emerging from war should also recognize 
that reducing violence and curbing illicit economies is a long-term en- 
deavor. In some situations, it may be the case that neglect is the only 
realistic option available to policymakers in the immediate term, as ad- 
dressing illicit economies directly may present obstacles to achieving 
peace agreements. However, it is worth remembering that national-level 
peace processes comprise only one aspect of peacebuilding; even if these 
issues are not immediately addressed in formal agreements, there are 
still opportunities to develop longer-term peacebuilding and economic 
strategies. Indeed, this strategy may have the added virtue of providing 
greater flexibility to adapt to changing economic and political circum- 
stances as needed, rather than conditioning the success of the peace 
process on rigid indicators that may become obsolete or impossible to 
sustain over time. For instance, a narrow and excessive focus on illicit 
drug cultivation levels as a metric of success is likely to be counterpro- 
ductive and should be jettisoned in favor of a more holistic approach, 
focused on achieving lasting reductions in poverty and all forms of vio- 
lence in communities involved in illicit drugs. 
Finally, policymakers should reassess their fundamental assump- 
tions about the statebuilding process as a whole, and consider how 
their strategies to address illicit economies are reflected in these 
assumptions. Scholars such as Strazzari and Kamphuis (2012) and 
Eriksen (2017) have observed that statebuilding efforts in contempo- 
rary contexts are hampered by a preoccupation with externally-driven 
strategies that are rooted in the shallow mimicry of external norms and 
institutions, rather than more contextual, conflict-sensitive approaches. 
These norms include prevailing assumptions about illicit economies, 
particularly their associations with violence outlined at the beginning 
of this piece. As a result, statebuilding policies predominantly view il- 
licit economies as a phenomenon to be brought under control —and in 
the case of illegal drugs, to be stamped out entirely —by the extension 
and application of often severe judicial and policing regimes. 
In the immediate aftermath of war, policymakers should recognize 
that such assumptions will not always serve them well, and should ap- 
proach them with a degree of skepticism and a heightened awareness of 
the trade-offs of various policies. Is the presence of illicit drugs always 
indicative of a crisis of statehood? Or are there circumstances under 
which illicit drugs and political stabilization could be complementary? 
Can countries tolerate a certain amount of illicit drugs while at the same 
time setting foundations for stable political settlements to emerge? Are 
the links between violence and illicit economies as valid as often pre- 
sumed, and can the most egregious patterns of violence be reined in 
without disrupting the economic livelihoods of large swathes of the pop- 
ulation? 
These are not easy questions, and the answers will no doubt vary be- 
tween contexts. However, a more holistic approach —one in which poli- 
cies towards illicit economies are rooted in wider strategies of peace 
formation and a gradual evolution towards inclusive and sustainable 
political settlements —is ultimately a preferable way forward. Schol- 
ars and stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding should therefore resist 
state-centric models that consider illicit economies as a phenomenon 
limited to the informal sector, and acknowledge that state institutions 
often have a symbiotic relationship with illicit economies, one that 
evolves over time ( Spear, 2006; Strazzari & Kamphuis, 2012 ). Simi- 
larly, overly-securitized approaches to the demobilization, disarmament 
and reintegration of armed combatants must also be reconsidered. As 
Torjesen (2006) has argued, policymakers should not only conceptual- 
ize peace processes as aimed at reducing the number of fighters and 
weapons, but take a broader view of how peace settlements will impact 
the economy, licit and illicit markets, and functioning of the state —and 
vice versa. 
A future research agenda 
There is much more to learn about the relationship between peace 
processes and illicit economies, which future research agendas in this 
area could address. 
Most of the evidence we have on illicit economies and peace pro- 
cesses is dominated by elite narratives, emphasizing the perspectives of 
those involved in shaping the peace process. These typically include his- 
torical or journalistic accounts of elite decision-making processes, and 
tends to be urban-focused and otherwise narrow in scope. While the 
evidence produced by this research is certainly important for under- 
standing the perceptions of those in power, a preoccupation with these 
narratives at the exclusion of other perspectives will limit our under- 
standing of the relationship between illicit economies and peace, and 
will produce policy insights of limited usefulness. Additional types of 
evidence, incorporating broader points of view, can complement this 
body of work. 
One approach that has yielded useful insights is based on a rich tra- 
dition of ethnographic research, often based in communities excluded 
from centers of power. As many of these communities are the most de- 
pendent on illicit economies and also typically the most affected by vi- 
olence, collecting data in these areas will help understand dynamics 
of peacebuilding and illicit economies from the perspective of commu- 
nities with the most at stake, and is therefore likely to produce more 
informed and inclusive policies. Although these types of studies often 
require large amounts of time and resources, they constitute a valu- 
able point of departure for understanding relationships between illicit 
economies and peacebuilding, and are deserving of more resources and 
attention. Ethnographic case studies of particular policy initiatives can 
also help illuminate useful questions: for instance, to what extent were 
illicit economies and violence impacted by the policies in question, if 
at all? How did policies impact interests and perceptions of different 
actors involved —not only government elites, but also non-government 
powerbrokers, members of non-state armed groups, and local communi- 
ties? Studies in this vein will improve our understanding of how various 
stakeholders perceive tradeoffs related to illicit economies and peace, 
and would be invaluable in advancing our knowledge on the subject. 
More comparative work should also be encouraged. While some com- 
parative studies exist, we lack a sufficient level of systematic compar- 
isons of how illicit economies have and could be addressed in peace 
processes, and what outcomes these processes have produced. While 
a number of studies have already been produced examining the eco- 
nomic dimensions of conflict duration and recurrence, these have typi- 
cally been carried out at the national level, while meso- and micro-level 
subnational settlements are comparatively neglected. Rigorous com- 
parative studies of how illicit economies are affected by local cease- 
fires —and vice versa —would make valuable contributions to the liter- 
ature. Furthermore, our understanding of how success and failure of 
illicit economies and peace agreements are defined and measured needs 
more refinement. At present, most studies or conflict measure success 
in terms of reductions in insurgent activity or violence; similarly, “suc- 
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cess ” in managing illicit economies is often defined according to narrow 
criteria such as reductions in levels of crop cultivation. These indicators 
often mask underlying realities of the political economy and the per- 
sistence of various forms of low-intensity violence, and say little about 
how these variables affect political dynamics that might support or un- 
dermine peace settlements. 
We would also benefit from further research on how international 
interventions might play a negative or destabilizing role in managing 
illicit economies. A few studies have shown that peace operations and 
foreign aid can become a contributor to fueling war economies, act- 
ing as a source of rents which can be co-opted by armed militias and 
criminal mafias ( Cockayne & Lupel, 2011; Hansen, 2014 ). As discussed 
above, pressure from external actors can compel governments to pass 
unpopular policies such as forced eradication, potentially undermining 
prospects for peace. More systematic research clarifying to what extent 
these actions contribute to destabilization —and developing improved 
policy recommendations so that these negative impacts may be avoided 
in the future —would be welcomed. At the same time, we should also 
seek out examples of where external intervention has been constructive, 
and identify positive lessons learned from these approaches. In violent 
settings, the most extreme failures often receive the most attention and 
resources. While it is important to understand and learn lessons from 
these cases, it is equally important to develop a wider and fully repre- 
sentative evidence base, including instances of where international en- 
gagement has helped countries successfully manage the transition from 
war to peace economies over time. A broader evidence base will help 
governments to learn from the experiences of countries which have over- 
come similar challenges, and deepen our collective knowledge of how to 
contribute to sustainable war to peace transitions in countries emerging 
from conflict. 
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